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Claude Lopez, PhD, Oscar Contreras, PhD, and Joseph Bendix 
Milken Institute, Research Department 
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Environmental, “E”, and governance, “G”, issues such as climate change and board composition have 
received a lot of attention in recent years, leading public firms to disclose related information to 
help/influence investors’ decision-making process. Some companies and investors have also focused on 
social issues such as treatment of employees, worker safety, or a company's contribution to community. 
Yet, these issues have been less prominent in investing decisions. However, recent events―from the on-
going social unrest to the impact of the pandemic on health and social inequalities ―are changing this 
landscape, elevating the "S" in ESG investment considerations.  
In the absence of a structured framework to report and monitor firms’ efforts on these dimensions, the 
burden lies on them to communicate on their initiatives and on investors to try to monitor them. New 
technologies, such as big data analysis or AI, can help process a larger set of information from different 
sources such as communication strategies of firms or other alternative sources. However, there is the need 
of defining a core set of variables that would capture these efforts as being part of a long-term strategy 
beyond the reaction to current events. ESG rating agencies could then process this information and provide 
their assessment of the firms.   
In this study, we show that using a common set of variables would partially resolve inconsistencies and the 
lack of comparability across rating providers that often confuse investors. Furthermore, we dissociate the 
impact of the rating agencies’ different focus on “E”, “S” or “G” from that of using different data. While the 
former, if properly disclosed, can be useful as it allows investors to choose what rating will be more in line 
with their preferences, the latter necessarily requires harmonization of the data collected. 
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Using information publicly available, we illustrate how difficult it is to understand or predict some of the 
existing ratings. Yet, we are also able to identify some commonalities: all rating considered agree on the 
worst performers. They also reach some consensus when measuring risks arising from governance factors, 
especially for Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy and Management. Corporate Social Responsibility 
Strategy includes variables that reflect a company's practices to communicate that it integrates the 
economic (financial), social and environmental dimensions into its day-to-day decision-making processes. 
Management includes variables that measure a company's commitment and effectiveness towards 
following best practice corporate governance principles. 
Overall, our study has two main implications when it comes to assessing how well-equipped firms are to 
deal with ESG risks. First, there is a need for standardization of the data, starting with common disclosure 
standards, aligning the different ESG disclosure standards existing across the world.  The resulting 
harmonization of the data to be collected would allow rationalizing the reporting burden on the firms while 
increasing the quality of the data collected. One option would be a centralized data collection via a portal, 
where each firm would report its information.  The different rating agencies, regulators, and other ESG data 
providers or users would then pull information from this data hub. Ultimately this will increase the firms' 
participation while improving the rating agencies' credibility in the eyes of investors. 
  
Creating harmonized and high-quality data is only part of the solution. The second implication of our study 
is the importance of transparency when it comes to the methodologies used to calculate the rating or the 
focus of the rating. In other words, are “E”, “S”, and “G” factors equally important? Or does the rating focus 
mostly on one dimension? Each method of aggregate of the data lead to a different rating, even when using 
the same data. Having different emphasis across different rating agencies can provide useful information 
as long as the difference reflects a clear prioritization from the rating agencies, emphasizing the ESG issues 
they deem the most important. If that is the case, the agencies need to be transparent about it with the 
rating users, investors, or firms, which in turn will decide which rating is most in line with their priorities. 
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2. INTRODUCTION 
Asset owners and managers are increasingly incorporating Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) 
factors into their financial analysis and decision-making processes. According to the Global Sustainable 
Investment Alliance—an international agency that collects information across Europe, the United States, 
Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand—, the value of assets under management with an explicit ESG 
mandate reached US$30.7 trillion at the beginning of 2018, an impressive 34 percent increase relative to 
2016. Investment strategies that explicitly incorporate ESG criteria now command a significant fraction of 
all professionally managed assets across all these regions, ranging from about 18 percent in Japan to more 
than 50 percent in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (see Figure 1.b).1 
                                                     
1 The volume of assets under management with an ESG focus can vary a lot depending on what is included. The numbers in the GSIA 
report should be considered as broad estimates, as they include multiple investment strategies. 
Figure 1. Professionally Managed Assets with an ESG Mandate 
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However, when carefully measured, ESG-focused funds remain a low percentage of the total assets under 
management at the world's largest asset managers (see Table 1). The lack of offering may be one of the 
explanations (see Figure 2 and Appendix 1). 
The increasing focus on ESG investing has led to the rise in the number and relative influence of ESG rating 
agencies. By providing cost-effective information services on a company's environmental, social, and 
governance performance, and therefore by potentially alleviating informational asymmetries among market 
participants, these agencies can play a crucial role in consolidating the market for ESG-related financial 
instruments. Better information on ESG practices is critical in allowing investors to incorporate these criteria 
into their decisions in a way that correctly reflects their preferences. Moreover, an independent assessment 
of a company's environmental, social, and governance performance can also present companies with an 
opportunity to differentiate themselves, potentially influencing them to adopt better practices to avert 
downgrades or improve their scores.2 
Some market participants remain skeptical of the value of the information provided by available ESG rating 
agencies. A recent survey conducted by Sustainalytics, a major provider of ESG research and ratings, found 
that while many investors regularly use ratings to inform their decisions, they are usually challenged and 
sometimes frustrated by them.3 Inconsistencies and lack of comparability across rating providers, in 
particular, have created confusion among investors and become a barrier to greater adoption of ESG 
investing.4 These discrepancies across ESG ratings also affect company managers, who not only face less 
pressure to improve their ESG performance but also find it harder to identify appropriate strategies to do 
so. 
Differences across ESG scores can naturally emerge if rating providers adopt different definitions of ESG 
performance, and as a result, end up assessing different dimensions. Some agencies, for example, may 
equate ESG performance with a company's ability to comply with specific ethical standards. In contrast, 
others may do it with a company's ability to manage financially material risks and opportunities arising from 
ESG factors. To a certain extent, the availability of ratings with different definitions is natural, given the 
                                                     
2 For an analysis of this “monitoring effect” in a corporate governance context, see Grimminger and Di Benedetta (2013). 
3 Wong and Petroy (2020). 
4 BNP Paribas (2019). 
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subjective nature of ESG criteria. But more important, it might be required to satisfy assets owners and 
managers with different needs and motivations. Thus, the focus should not be on agreeing on a single 
definition but on data-standardization, achieving greater clarity in the labeling of the ratings and more 
transparency regarding their objectives. These would allow market participants to differentiate products 
better and to determine whether a particular definition aligns well with their goals. 
Inconsistencies across ESG rating agencies are not only an issue of definitions. At least two other reasons 
can lead rating providers to differing scores on the same company. First, rating providers may disagree on 
how to measure the same ESG factor. Despite efforts by multiple standard-setting organizations, there is 
no universally accepted approach to measuring non-financial indicators. Rating agencies employ hundreds 
of ESG-related variables. Some of them come from company reports and regulatory filings and, therefore, 
should be consistent across agencies. Yet, many others are privately obtained through interviews or 
questionnaires and third-party independent reports with potentially conflicting approaches. Second, even 
if agencies agree on how to measure different ESG-related factors, each ESG agency has developed its own 
methodology to decide what ESG-related indicators to consider and how to aggregate them into an overall 
score. 
Besides documenting the extend of the disagreement among ESG scores, in this report, we provide some 
insights into the drivers behind the inconsistencies.  We contrast the impact of the data used and of the 
methodologies. We agree that the lack of data standardization is an issue for both investors and assessed 
firms, and it should be resolved by harmonization of the data collected and streamlining of the process. 
However, it is less clear to us that the difference in methodology is a negative thing if it reflects each rating 
agencies prioritization or specialization in a particular dimension, E, S or G.  In that case, it has to be 
transparent regarding what it is choice providing rating user with a better understanding of the underlying 
process that least to the assessment. Overall, we hope to inform market participants on how to contextualize 
and critically evaluate discrepancies in ESG scores and offer some useful information on how to potentially 
address them.  
Our analysis focuses on rating agencies that employ the same definition of ESG performance: a company's 
ability to manage financially material risks and opportunities arising from ESG factors. As mentioned before, 
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this allows us to concentrate on differences arising from two sources of disagreement: how agencies 
measure ESG factors and the methodologies they use to aggregate them into a single score.  
We shed light on the sources behind the disagreement among ESG rating agencies using an indirect 
approach. Our indirect method relies on machine learning techniques to identify and estimate the 
relationship between the ESG ratings and a set of explanatory variables publicly available—which do not 
(necessarily) coincide with the ones used by the rating agencies. We then compare the identified 
relationships across the three different rating agencies using various methods. Finally, we assess the ability 
of our estimated ratings to replicate the disagreement observed among the agencies' ratings. 
While all the agencies considered in our study use the same definition of ESG performance, we observe that 
their ratings coincide -- at a level similar to that usually observed for other types of ratings -- only across 
the worst performers, which represent a relatively small number of firms. Overall, we not only find 
substantial discrepancies among rating providers, but we also show that such inconsistencies cannot be 
easily explain based on information readily available to investors.  
It is difficult for an investor to understand or predict a ranking as both the methodology and the data used 
are different and unavailable for review. Yet the predictive power analysis and the contribution analysis in 
our study indicate relative consistency across rating agencies on the appropriate way to measure financially 
material risks arising from governance factors.  
More broadly, our analysis has two main implications when it comes to assessing how well-equipped firms 
are to deal with ESG related risk. First, the use of standardized data will lead to more comparable ratings. 
This would benefit both the firms being evaluated and the investors using these evaluations, as it would 
lead to a clearer link between the information and its impact on the assessment. A firm could then decide 
the appropriate strategy to improve its rating, and an investor would understand the implications of the 
rating in terms of ESG risk management. Several ESG disclosure standards already exist across the world, 
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which is why an alignment around a common disclosure framework is necessary.5.6 As our results show, 
there may be some dimensions, such as governance, for which some consensus may already exist.  
The second implication of our analysis is that the lack of standardized data is only part of the problem: the 
other critical factor is that each rating agency has its own method to aggregate the information. There is a 
benefit in having different emphasis across different rating agencies. However, such a diversified set of 
information is useful to the rating users if they are able to understand what each rating is capturing. Only 
in that case, the users can then decide how to use the information when defining an investment strategy or 
in making strategic decisions to improve a rating. 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. To establish common terminology, we begin with a 
discussion of the definition of ESG investing. We then document the extent of disagreement over ESG scores 
across three major rating agencies at different levels of aggregation. Next, we use machine learning 
techniques to better understands how the various rating agencies assess a company's ESG performance 
based on a set of explanatory variables publicly available. Finally, we offer some conclusions drawn from 
our analysis.  
  
                                                     
5 Novick (2020) discusses several issues related to the convergence of ESG disclosure.  
6 See Clarkin et al. (2020) for a list of the different initiatives across the globe. 
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Table 1.  Assets Under Management in ESG-Focused Funds 
Company 
AUM 
($US Billions) 
ESG Investment 
($US Billions) 
ESG AUM  
Percentage 
BlackRock $6,470.00 $17.58 0.27% 
Vanguard $6,200.00 $9.54 0.15% 
UBS $3,260.00 $0.29 0.01% 
Fidelity $2,900.00 $0.67 0.02% 
State Street $2,690.00 $0.17 0.01% 
Allianz $2,490.00 $0.21 0.01% 
Capital Group $2,060.00 $0.00 0.00% 
JP Morgan Asset Management $1,900.00 $0.08 0.00% 
Goldman Sachs $1,859.00 $0.13 0.01% 
Bank of New York Mellon $1,800.00 $0.36 0.02% 
PIMCO $1,780.00 $1.96 0.11% 
Amundi $1,653.00 $0.32 0.02% 
Prudential Financial $1,481.00 $0.00 0.00% 
AXA Group $879.00 $0.00 0.00% 
Morgan Stanley $552.00 $6.72 1.22% 
Source: Morningstar Direct (7/5/2020). 
Note:  Funds classified as ESG explicitly stated in their mandates that the investments were chosen primarily for their ESG-risk 
mitigating characteristics. Keywords in the primary investment mandate also include impact investing, gender/ethnic diversification, 
and environmental sustainability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Fund Satisfying Basic Investment Screen: ESG-Focused Funds vs Overall Category  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Morningstar Direct (7/5/2020). 
Note: Out of 288 ESG-focused funds identified by Morningstar in the U.S., only 104 would pass a simple investment screen 
commonly employed by fund-of-fund managers: at least three years of historical returns and a fund size over US$50 million 
(Lauricella, 2020). 
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 ******************************************************************************* 
BOX 3 ESG SCORES LEVELS AND FINANCIAL VARIABLES  
This box illustrates the relationship between ESG score levels and some widely used financial variables for 
the studied group of companies.  
After sorting the firms from the largest (10th decile) to the smallest (1st decile) based on their market 
capitalization, Figure 3 plots the average Beta (a measure of a particular asset's volatility relative to the risk 
of general systemic market movement) and the average ESG scores for the three rating agencies. All three 
rating agencies award higher average scores to larger companies. These same firms show overall more 
resilience (lower Beta) to risks, including ESG ones. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. ESG Scores and Beta by Market Capitalization Decile 
ESG Scores                                                                 
Beta 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data. 
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3. WHAT IS ESG INVESTING? 
Although there is no universally excepted definition, ESG investing is widely understood as an investment 
approach that goes beyond the analysis of traditional financial indicators by incorporating Environmental, 
Social, and Governance (ESG) factors into the investment process (i.e., the process of selecting and 
managing an investment portfolio). Of course, ESG considerations are not entirely new, and, in various ways, 
many investors have long incorporated some of these issues into their investment frameworks. The modern 
reference to ESG investing, however, denotes a more explicit and systematic integration of ESG factors into 
the investment process, as opposed to a more informal, less structured approach. 
Investors can have multiple motivations 
Investors seek to integrate ESG factors into their financial decisions for various (not mutually exclusive) 
reasons. (See Box 2 for a list of factors commonly referred to as ESG.) 
 Some investors may consider that ESG data can help paint a broader picture of a company's 
operating environment. Accordingly, they rely on ESG investing to identify and manage risks and 
opportunities that cannot be easily detected through standard financial analysis—that is, as a source 
of financial value. According to Dan Hanson, former managing director at BlackRock, "ESG is a proxy 
for risk that is not priced in, and companies that better manage these risks can deliver returns with 
greater certainty…"7 Reducing exposure to polluters or companies with poor waste management 
policies, for example, can help mitigate regulatory risk, whereas screening for good social practices 
(such as workplace culture, human rights protection, or corporate community engagement) can 
reduce exposure to scandals that could damage a company's reputation.8 
 Other investors rely on ESG investing to meet their values (e.g., ethical, religious, political, or 
cultural) or to promote specific environmental, social, or governance outcomes they deem 
desirable. Investors, for instance, may integrate ESG factors into their financial decisions to identify 
and exclude companies engaging in practices they find morally questionable, such as low labor 
standards or human rights violations. These investors might seek to advance their non-financial 
                                                     
7 Cited in Koehler and Hespenheide (2013). 
8 For studies on the relationship between ESG performance and profitability, see Friede et al. (2015) and, more recently, Verheyden et 
al. (2016). 
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objectives without hampering financial objectives. In some cases, they might even be willing to 
sacrifice financial returns to achieve their non-financial goals. A recent survey conducted by UBS 
among asset owners across 46 countries found that "doing good for society and the environment" 
is among the top four drivers behind ESG investing. 9 
 And still others, such as institutional investors or financial advisors acting on behalf of a third party, 
may rely on ESG criteria to satisfy specific legal requirements. One of the world's largest investment 
funds, for example, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, is mandated to avoid 
companies that contribute or are responsible for "serious or systematic human rights violations,…, 
serious violations of the rights of individuals in situations of war or conflict, severe environmental 
damage,…, gross corruption, [or] other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical norms."10 
Multiple labels for similar issues 
Despite its growing popularity, there are substantial terminological and conceptual inconsistencies 
surrounding ESG investing. Phrases such as sustainable, responsible, or socially responsible investing are 
sometimes conflated or used interchangeably with the term ESG investing, while other times, they are used 
to denote related but conceptually different ideas. Understandably, the broad array of terms used to 
describe various ESG approaches, together with a lack of consistency in their use, has created confusion 
among investors. A recent survey conducted by State Street Global Advisors found that over half of those 
investors already implementing some type of ESG strategy within their portfolio were struggling with a lack 
of clarity around ESG terminology in their organizations.11 
To reduce confusion among investors, and because the common theme underlying all the different labels 
is an emphasis on ESG issues, we believe that the more neutral term ESG investing is appropriate. 
Accordingly, we see ESG investing as an umbrella term—one that, as mentioned above, refers to an 
investment approach that involves some type of environmental, social, or governance consideration, that 
                                                     
9 See, for example, Fritsch (2019). 
10 Norway’ Ministry of Finance (2019). 
11 State Street Global Advisors (2018). 
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can have various motivations, and that, depending on the investor's goals, resources, and circumstances, 
may result in different strategies.12 
 
 
 
                                                     
12 For a detailed discussion on how to incorporate ESG factors into the investment process, see Grim and Berkowitz (2018). 
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BOX 2:  
ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE (ESG) FACTORS 
Broadly defined, environmental factors focus on a company's environmental impact, social factors 
examine how it manages relationships with different stakeholders—such as customers, employees, 
suppliers, and the communities within which it operates—, and governance factors deal with a 
company's leadership, internal controls, and shareholder rights.  
ESG factors cover a wide range of topics and the relevant issues are likely to depend on the company 
being analyzed, its industry, and, ultimately, on the investor's preferences and objectives. For these 
reasons, it should not be surprising that a definitive list of ESG factors does not exist. 
 The table below displays some examples of well-known ESG factors. 
Environmental  Social  Governance 
- Climate change policies, 
plans, and disclosure 
practices 
- Air and water pollution 
- Deforestation 
- Biodiversity impact 
- Water stress 
- Waste and hazardous 
materials management 
- Usage of renewable 
Energy 
 - Community 
engagement 
- Human rights 
- Labor practices 
- Product safety  
- Data security and 
customer privacy  
- Diversity and inclusion 
- Customer relations 
- Ethical supply chain 
sourcing 
- Management structure 
- Executive compensation 
- Board composition 
- Business integrity  
- Transparency 
- Bribery and corruption 
- Lobbying 
- Whistleblower schemes 
- Shareholder relations 
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4. DISAGREEMENT AMONG ESG RATING AGENCIES 
Our analysis considers three major rating agencies that emphasize the financial materiality of ESG factors 
when measuring a company's ESG performance: RobecoSAM, Sustainalytics, and Thomson Reuters.13 As 
mentioned in the introduction, considering only rating agencies that agree on a definition of ESG 
performance allows us to concentrate on differences arising from how agencies measure ESG factors and 
the methodologies they use to aggregate them into a single score.  Our sample contains annual information 
on 943 firms for the year 2018, the latest for which all three ESG scores were available.14 The data were 
collected from Bloomberg and Refinitiv-Eikon.  
 
 
                                                     
13 According to Gaffuri (2017), RobecoSAM’s methodology seeks to identify “…any [ESG] factor which might have a present or future 
impact on companies’ value drivers, competitive position, and thus on long-term shareholder value creation.” According to 
Sutainalytics (2019), its rating “measure[s] the degree to which a company’s economic value is at risk driven by ESG factors.” And 
according to Thomson Reuters (2017), its rating helps to “easily identify companies with…exposure to ESG risks.” 
14 To construct our sample of firms, we started with the 2000 largest companies by market capitalization. We then excluded companies 
for which we were unable to procure information on all three different ESG scores, as well as companies for which a substantial fraction 
of the explanatory variables used in the following section was missing. For multiannual scores, we consider the last available for 2018. 
Figure 4. ESG Score Distributions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon. 
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Table 2. Correlations between ESG Ratings 
  
Pair of Scores Correlation 
RobecoSAM vs Sustainalytics 0.72 
RobecoSAM vs Thomson Reuters 0.65 
Sustainalytics vs Thomson Reuters 0.65 
Source: Authors' calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data. 
Note: The correlations are the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. 
 
A simple glance at the distributions of ESG ratings (see Figure 4) confirms that the agencies' assessments 
of the firms are quite different: most of Thomson Reuters scores are concentrated around high values, 
between 50 to 80, while RobecoSAM and Sustainalytics spread them mostly evenly between10 and 90.  
The pairwise correlations, reported in Table 2, confirm that RobecoSAM and Sustainalytics tend to agree 
the most in their assessment with a correlation of 0.72. Yet, this level of agreement is significantly lower 
than the one usually encountered among credit rating, with an average correlation of 0.986.15  
4.1. DISAGREEMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR 
A look at the economic sectors, with Figure 5 for correlations and Table 3 for a short description of the 
sectors including their unique regulatory and financial characteristics, allows us to derive more granular 
insights on the differences: 16  
 The overall level of agreement among rating agencies (i.e., the average pairwise correlation between 
ESG scores) varies substantially across sectors, ranging from 0.50 in Energy to 0.77 in Technology. 
                                                     
15 For other studies reporting correlations among ESG rating agencies, see Berg et al. (2020), Gibson et al. (2019), and State Street 
Global Advisors (2019). 
16 We use the Thomson Reuters Business Classification to assign each company into one of ten different economic sectors. 
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 The highest within-sector heterogeneity in the level of agreement among rating agencies occurs in 
the sector with the lowest correlation, Energy.17 The companies in this sector may be harder to 
evaluate, as they are highly regulated or because significant investments in infrastructure make it 
harder to identify the relevant ESG risks and the appropriate strategies to deal with those risks.  
 Sectors with a higher level of agreement among rating agencies, such as Financials, Technology, 
and Cyclical Consumer Goods & Services, seem to have less emphasis on environmental factors, 
particularly the first two. This could indicate, for example, more consistency across rating agencies 
on the appropriate way to measure financially material risks arising from social and governance 
factors.  
Overall, the three rating agencies give very different ESG scores, with a correlation below 0.5, to more than 
60% of the firms. In contrast, they have a very similar assessment, with a correlation of 0.95 or more, for 
only 10% of the firms, the worst-performing ones. (See Appendices 3 and 4 for an analysis of disagreement 
by market capitalization decile and at the firm level.) 
                                                     
17 The higher heterogeneity in the Energy sector should be taken carefully, for it is also one of the sectors with the lowest number of 
observations (48). 
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Substantial discrepancies in ESG scores across rating agencies is a problem for both investors and 
companies. Investors may have difficulties in integrating ESG factors into their portfolios in a manner that 
reflects their preferences. Companies could be discouraged from improving their ESG performance, as they 
may not be able to identify an appropriate strategy to do so, or they may find the outcome too uncertain 
and not worth the investment.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Correlations between ESG Scores by Economic Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data. 
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Table 3. Economic Sectors: Description and Unique Features 
 Sector Description Unique Financial & Regulatory Characteristics 
Basic 
Material 
(68) 
Companies involved in the discovery, 
development, and processing of raw 
materials, including mining and metal 
refining, chemicals, and packaging. 
Recognizable names in the sector include 
Ecolab, Dupont, and Dow.   
Companies in this sector supply most of the materials 
used in construction. Thus, they are sensitive to changes 
in the business cycle and tend to thrive when the 
economy is strong, exhibiting a rather high Beta of 1.13 
on average.  
Consumer 
Cyclical 
(120) 
Companies that produce elastic, or non-
essential goods and services purchased 
by individuals and households such as 
Automobiles (Ford/GM), Specialty 
Retailers (Amazon), Hotels & 
Entertainment (Marriott International), 
and Media-Publishing (ViacomCBS).  
Compared to the Consumer Non-Cyclical sector, the 
Consumer Cyclical sector has higher profit margins than 
the, but its demand is more sensitive to the business 
cycle. The sector has a rather reactive Beta to the market, 
at 1.17. Consumer Non-Cyclical companies trade at the 
lowest sector average of 2.1x sales.  
Consumer 
Non-
Cyclical 
(82) 
Companies that produce inelastic or 
essential goods and services purchased 
by individuals and households. Industries 
within the sector include Food and Drug 
Retailers (e.g., Walmart), Food and 
Tobacco producers (e.g., General Mills), 
Beverage producers (e.g., Coca-Cola), and 
Personal & Household Products/Services 
(e.g., Proctor & Gamble).  
Within the Consumer Non-Cyclical sector, businesses 
provide goods/services that have a relatively inelastic 
demand. Due to this inelasticity, Consumer Non-Cyclical 
companies can employ larger debt levels relative to 
other sectors, utilizing leverage to increase ROE. 
Consumer Non-Cyclicals exhibit a comparatively smaller 
average Beta at just .65.   
Energy 
(48) 
The energy sector includes companies 
involved in the exploration and 
development of oil or gas reserves, oil 
and gas drilling, and refining like 
recognizable names Exxon Mobil, 
Chevron, Occidental Petroleum and 
Schlumberger.  
Companies in the Energy sector incur large capital 
expenditure costs to create and maintain core business 
activity infrastructure. Energy providers are extremely 
susceptible to output pricing and supply and demand 
shocks, leading to the highest average Beta across 
sectors (at 1.36). The industry also pays out the largest 
dividend yield to investors, averaging 7.06% on an 
annual basis.  
Financials 
(226) 
The largest represented sector in the S&P 
500 by number of firms. It includes large 
banking institutions (e.g., JP Morgan 
Chase and Bank of America), payment 
services (e.g., American Express), as well 
as insurance and asset management 
institutions (e.g., BlackRock and MetLife). 
The Financials sector treats debt fundamentally different 
from all other economic sectors, utilizing it as a revenue-
generating asset from a lender/investor perspective. This 
creates the widest discrepancy between enterprise value 
and market capitalization at 2.09:1 ratio among the 
economic sectors. Financials is more volatile than the 
overall market, with an average Beta of 1.08.  Return on 
Equity for the sector was 12.01%, below the sector-
agnostic average of 27%. The Financials sector is also 
highly regulated and therefore affected by 
governmental decisions.  
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Healthcare 
(83) 
The Healthcare sector consists of 
companies that provide medical services 
(UnitedHealth Group/Cigna), healthcare 
equipment and devices (Johnson & 
Johnson/Thermo Fisher Scientific), and 
Pharmaceuticals/Biotechnology 
(Gilead/Pfizer/Merck).   
Because of the necessity of its products, the Healthcare 
sector has a Beta (.98) that most closely mirrors the 
S&P500, while generating the 2nd highest average ROE 
at 31%. Influenced by outliers within the highly volatile 
biotechnology industry, the Healthcare sector has by far 
the largest average EV/EBIT valuation multiple at 111x, 
ranging from 7x to 7,152x. The sector also exhibits the 
second highest average Price-to Earnings ratio at 38, 
partly due to the highly regulated FDA approval process 
(with successful drug patents allowing for monopolies 
on certain drug/treatment advancements that possess 
pricing power to recoup R&D costs).  
Industrials 
(132) 
Enterprises that produce machinery 
(Boeing/Caterpillar), passenger and 
material transportation (Delta/UPS), and 
Aerospace & Defense (Lockheed 
Martin/Raytheon) all fall under the 
industrials umbrella.  
The most diverse sector in terms of products or services, 
Industrials exhibits the largest range of ROE in the 
S&P500, returning anywhere between -225% and 
+766%. Industrials also exhibits comparatively lower 
valuation multiples on average: 14x EV/EBITDA, 16x 
EV/EBIT, 2.8x EV/Sales, & 21 P/E.  
Technology 
(96) 
The Technology sector offers a wide 
range of products and services for both 
customers and other businesses. 
Industries within the Technology sector 
include Software & IT (e.g., Microsoft), 
Communications & Networking (e.g., 
Facebook), Computers, Phones, 
Household Electronics (e.g., Apple), and 
Office Equipment (e.g., Cisco).  
The Technology sector is unique in a myriad of ways, and 
contrary to other sectors, profit takes a back seat to 
growth, and operating metrics are not as pertinent to the 
valuation discussion. Because of this growth focus, 
operators in this sector tend to shy away from debt 
financing, exhibiting a comparatively low 82% Debt-to-
Equity Ratio on average for 2018. The propensity for 
equity financing provides for larger cash-on-hand in the 
balance sheet, making it the only sector in the S&P500 
who's average Market Capitalization is actually greater 
than the Enterprise Value of the firm. Strong cash 
infusions through equity offerings allow tech companies 
to possess the largest average Current and Quick Ratios 
on the balance sheet, at 2.35 and 2.14, respectively.  The 
Technology sector is characterized by high average 
valuation multiples, trading at 22x EBITDA, 5.5x Sales, 
and 52x Earnings, the highest of any sector.  
Telecom 
(29) 
The Telecommunications sector consists 
of companies that transmit data in words, 
voice, audio, or video across the globe. 
Recognizable names in the sector include 
AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, and 
CenturyLink.   
While the sector remains concentrated, it is moving 
towards a more decentralized system with less 
regulation and barriers to entry. Beta is much lower than 
average at .62. Because firms often operate on a 
subscription and revenue recognition model, dividend 
yields are larger than in most other economic sectors at 
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an average of 5.52% yield per year, second only to 
Energy.  
Utilities 
(59) 
The Utilities sector includes companies 
that provide basic amenities, such as 
water, sewage services, electricity, dams, 
and natural gas. Some of the larger names 
in the sector are Nextera Energy, Duke 
Energy, Edison International, and 
Sempra.  
Utilities are part of the public service landscape and 
therefore heavily regulated. It typically offer stable and 
consistent dividends (4.47%), coupled with less price 
volatility relative to equity markets, possessing the 
smallest average Beta at .61. Because of the inelastic 
nature of the products and services provided, Utilities 
companies do not need the same type of balance sheet 
cash cushion required in other Economic Sectors, 
allowing them to possess the lowest average Quick and 
Current Ratios of any sector at .85 and .93, respectively.  
Source: Authors' calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data. 
Notes: The number in parenthesis below the sector name indicates the number of companies in our sample. 
 
5. WHAT IS DRIVING THE DISCREPANCIES IN ESG SCORES? 
Understanding what drives these discrepancies is essential to make sense of them. Not having access to the 
raw data or to the detailed methodologies employed by the different ESG rating agencies, our analysis of 
their disagreement relies on an indirect approach that uses publicly available information. It consists of 
three steps: 
1. Collection of publicly available ESG and other indicators for the firms studied. A total of 
207 ESG indicators (58 related to environmental factors, 70 to social factors, and 79 to corporate 
governance factors), as well as 35 financial variables and information on both headquarters 
location and economic sector.18  
2. Estimation of the relation between the ESG ratings and the explanatory variables. 
Standard econometric techniques cannot easily handle a large number of variables, and they 
usually require specifying a particular structure on the relationships among variables. As an 
alternative, we use a machine learning technique called random forest. Random forest models 
                                                     
 18 The data were collected from Refinitiv-Eikon, a major provider of financial news and information. A detailed list of all the explanatory 
variables is provided in available upon request. 
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can accommodate complex, non-linear patterns and can handle different types of variables 
efficiently.19  
3. Comparison of the estimation results across rating agencies that look at three distinct and 
complementary angles: (i) the variables' ability to predict the ESG scores, (ii) their contribution 
to the ratings predicted by our estimation, and (iii) the importance of variables interaction when 
predicting the ESG scores. Exercises (i) and (ii) tell us how informative individual variables are 
regarding the content of the ratings. On the other hand, (iii) tell us something about how that 
information is aggregated into a single score (not how agencies actually do it, but how it is 
done in terms of the estimated relations between ratings and explanatory variables). Finally, we 
compare the disagreement among the predicted ESG ratings with the one observed among the 
agencies' ratings.   
                                                     
19 In contrast to other algorithms, random forest models also generate an internal measure of the model’s ability to predict previously 
unseen observations, thereby eliminating the need to use a separate dataset to evaluate their performance. 
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20 For a detailed discussion, see Breiman (2001). 
BOX 4 
RANDOM FOREST MODELS: A PRIMER 
A random forest is a machine learning algorithm. It combines the outcomes of a large number of 
individual decision trees to generate a single prediction, either by calculating the average (when the 
prediction variable is continuous) or by implementing a "majority vote" (when the prediction variable is 
categorical).20 Unsurprisingly, the model is called a forest because it relies on a multiplicity of decision 
trees. But what exactly is a decision tree? Why do we need many of them? And in what sense is the 
forest random?  
A decision tree is a predictive algorithm that, as its name implies, uses a tree-like structure to predict 
the value of a target variable using a set of explanatory variables. A decision tree starts with a single 
node, which then branches into possible outcomes based on the value of one of the explanatory 
variables. Each of those outcomes leads to additional nodes, which once again branch off into other 
possibilities based on another explanatory variable, giving it a tree-like shape. This process continues 
until a terminal node is reached, which leads to no additional sub-nodes and contains our prediction for 
the variable of interest. Decisions regarding what explanatory variables to use at each node, and how to 
use them to split the tree, are taken sequentially (from top to bottom) and are based on the gain in 
precision induced by the split. 
Although decision trees provide a very intuitive modeling approach, they tend to perform poorly when 
predicting previously unseen observations (i.e., observations that were not used to estimate the model). 
This poor performance occurs because decision trees suffer from a problem called "high variance." Since 
decision tree models are incredibly flexible, they tend to overfit the data used to estimate them. As a 
result, decision trees tend to capture not only the actual relationship between predictors and outcome 
but also the noise contained in the sample (which results in poor predictive performance). 
Various techniques (such as pruning, minimum node size, and maximum number of terminal nodes) can 
mitigate overfitting, but estimating a random forest is one of the most common approaches. The basic 
idea is simple: by combining a large number of "imperfect" decision trees, we can "average out" their 
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5.1. IS IT ABOUT THE DATA?  
We use data publicly available on the firms to identify what information the ESG ratings are capturing. 
Although these variables do not necessarily coincide with those employed by the rating agencies, we can 
expect them to be related to the various ESG ratings—and therefore to be informative about their content. 
Furthermore, using the same variables across the ratings allow us to indirectly assess the impact of 
standardization of the information. 
5.1.1. VARIABLE'S PREDICTIVE POWER21 
One way to do that is by assessing the ability of the explanatory variables, individually or grouped, to predict 
the ESG scores provided by the rating agencies. 
  
                                                     
21 Our analysis is based on two of the most widely used measures, Mean Decrease in Impurity and Perturbation Importance, using Li 
et al. (2019) and Breiman (2001), respectively.  
individual mistakes and dramatically improve the accuracy of our predictions. This approach, however, 
requires that each decision tree in the forest be different so that it provides new information. It is here 
where the "random" part of the model becomes relevant. Although ideally we would like to estimate 
each decision trees using a different sample from the population of interest, this is rarely feasible. 
Instead, we can achieve something similar by injecting randomness into the tree-growing process by 
doing the following: 1) estimating each tree using a different random sample with replacement drawn 
from the original dataset, and 2) every time we must decide how to split a node, limiting the search to 
a randomly selected subset of explanatory variables. 
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First, focusing on the top ten variables with the highest predictive power for each of the ESG scores, Table 
4 shows that: 22  
- The factors have different predictive power across the ratings. Although environmental factors seem to 
be important predictors for all three ESG scores, they are disproportionally so for Thomson Reuter. By 
contrast, RobecoSAM and Sustainalytics appear to offer a more balanced picture across environmental, 
social, and governance indicators.   
                                                     
22 The top predictors were chosen by ranking all explanatory variables in ascending order according to each of our two measures and 
selecting the first ten variables to appear in both rankings. 
Table 4. Top Ten Predictors for ESG Scores 
Thomson Reuters RobecoSAM Sustainalytics 
Environmental Variables 
 Targets Emissions 
 Resource Reduction Policy  
 Policy Emissions 
 Environmental Supply 
Chain Management  
 Policy Environmental 
Supply Chain  
 Environment Management 
Training  
 Policy Energy Efficiency 
 Targets Emissions 
 Renewable Energy Use   
 Resource Reduction 
Targets 
 Targets Emissions 
 Renewable Energy Use 
 Environmental Supply Chain 
Management  
 Policy Environmental Supply 
Chain 
 Resource Reduction Targets 
Social Variables 
 Flexible Working Hours  ILO Fundamental Human 
Rights 
 Human Rights Contractor 
 Policy Human Rights 
 ILO Fundamental Human Rights 
 Human Rights Contractor 
Governance Variables 
 CSR Reporting 
 Independent Board 
Members 
 CSR Reporting 
 Stakeholder Engagement 
 Global Compact 
Signatory 
 Board Gender Diversity 
 CSR Reporting 
 Stakeholder Engagement 
 Global Compact Signatory 
Source: Authors' calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data. 
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- Very few factors overlap across the three agencies. Of the top ten predictors, only two are common 
among all rating providers: Targets Emissions and CSR Reporting.23 However, RobecoSAM and 
Sustainalytics share eight common top predictors. 
Second, we extend the analysis to all the variables. To do so we aggregate them in categories when 
assessing their predictive power for the different ratings. Figure 6 reports the outcome when considering 
five broad categories: environmental, social, governance, financial, and others. Figure 7 expands the analysis 
to 18 subcategories: three environmental, four social, three governance, six financial, and two related to 
other factors.  
  The overall environmental and governance factors have the highest predictive power for all 
three ESG scores, followed by social and financial considerations—in no particular order—and, finally, 
by other factors. 
 Emissions and Resource Use have the most predictive power for environmental factors. Emissions 
refers to variables that measure a company's commitment and effectiveness towards reducing 
environmental emissions in the production and operational processes. Resource Use refers to 
variables that reflect a company's performance and capacity to reduce the use of materials, Energy, 
or water, and to find more eco-efficient solutions by improving supply chain management. The 
subcategory Innovation, which includes variables that reflect a company's capacity to reduce its 
environmental impact through new environmental technologies and processes, shows little power.  
 CSR Strategy and Management capture most of the predictive power of Governance factors 
across the ratings.24 Yet, Management is significantly more relevant than CSR Strategy in predicting 
Sustainalytics ESG scores. The results also confirm our previous finding that the relative importance 
of environmental variables is significantly higher for Thomson Reuters that for the other two rating 
agencies. 
                                                     
23 Targets Emissions measures whether a company has set and achieved short-term and long-term reduction targets to reduce 
emissions to land, air, or water from business operations. CSR Reporting measures a company’s efforts to publish a report on Corporate 
Social Responsibility, Health, and Safety, or Sustainability issues. 
24 CSR Strategy includes variables that reflect a company’s practices to communicate that it integrates the economic (financial), social 
and environmental dimensions into its day-to-day decision-making processes. On the other hand, Management includes variables that 
measure a company’s commitment and effectiveness towards following best practice corporate governance principles. 
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 Among social variables, Human Rights and Workforce have the highest predictive power across 
all agencies, whereas Product Responsibility has the lowest.25 However, while Workforce is the most 
critical social subcategory for Thomson Reuter, Human Rights is the top predictor for RobecoSAM and 
Sustainalytics.   
 
                                                     
25 Human Rights include variables that measure a company’s effectiveness towards respecting the fundamental human rights 
conventions. Workforce refers to variables that reflect a company’s effectiveness towards job satisfaction, a healthy and safe workplace, 
maintaining diversity and equal opportunities and development opportunities for its workforce. Product Responsibility includes 
variables that reflect a company’s capacity to produce quality goods and services integrating the customer’s health and safety, integrity 
and data privacy. 
Figure 6. Predictive Power by Category 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data.  
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Figure 7. Predictive Power by Subcategory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data. 
a)  Measure 1: Mean Decrease in Impurity 
 
b)  Measure 2: Perturbation Impurity 
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5.1.2. VARIABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 
The other way to identify what information the ESG ratings are capturing is to evaluate how much each 
variable contributes to the predicted ESG rating. To do so, we use the predictive power of the variables to 
generate new ESG ratings. We then estimate the actual contribution of each group of variables to these 
predicted ESG ratings. Figure 8 reports the results for the categories and Figure 9 for the subcategories.26 
Ultimately, this allows us to identify how much the different factors matter when calculating the various 
ratings, based on the information derived from the Machine Leaning analysis: 
 Governance and financial variables are the top two contributors for all three agencies. 
Governance is the category whose importance is robust across the two analyses: prediction 
power of a category as well as contribution to the predicted score. Yet, its magnitude varies 
significantly across rating providers.  
 Management and CSR Strategy drive the contribution of governance, in line with the 
previous analysis. Yet, CSR Strategy contributes negatively to the predicted Sustainalytics score.  
 Balance Sheet and Cash Flow Statement drive the contribution of financial variables. And 
both are negatively related to the predicted Sustainalytics score. 
 Environment variables are still important for the predicted Thomson Reuters score, 
especially Emissions and Resources Use. 
 Workforce remains an important sub-category for social variables, in line with the previous 
analysis.  
                                                     
26 See Appendix 7 for more details on how variable contributions are calculated. 
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Figure 8. Contribution to Predicted ESG Scores by Category 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data. 
 
 
Thomson Reuters RobecoSAM Sustainalytics
0.00 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.06
Other
Financial
Governance
Social
Environmental
Contribution
C
a
te
g
o
ry
Figure 9. Contribution to Predicted ESG Scores by Subcategory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data. 
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5.2. IS IT ABOUT THE METHODS? 
Beyond the variables, the methods used to aggregate the information differ from one rating to another. 
We illustrate this point by looking at how the variables interact. Finally, we show how challenging it is for 
investors to rationalize and understand the discrepancies across agencies by comparing the rating we 
have generated with the one provided by the agencies. 
5.2.1. VARIABLE INTERACTIONS 
Looking at the interaction among variables or group of variables provides insights on how the different 
agencies' aggregate information impacts the ratings.  
We use the estimated random forests to determine whether—and to what extent—the different explanatory 
variables interact with each other when predicting the ESG scores. The overall interaction (see Figures 10 
and 11) is quite different across the ratings, especially at the subcategory level. For example, while the 
overall interaction effects of environmental variables are concentrated on the subcategory Resource Use for 
the predicted Thomson Reuters and RobecoSAM ratings, they appear to be (roughly) evenly divided 
between Emission and Resource Use for Sustainalytics. Similarly, although the overall interaction effects 
associated with governance variables seem to be concentrated on the subcategory Management for the 
predicted Sustainalytics rating, they are more evenly distributed between Management and Shareholders 
for RobecoSAM and (to a lesser extent) for Thomson Reuters. 
Figures 12 and 13 focus on the pairwise interaction by category and subcategories. 27 These pairwise effects 
measure the extent to which variables belonging to one group interact with variables in another group. As 
expected, the results show significant differences across rating agencies. For the predicted Thomson 
Reuters, for example, most pairwise interaction effects are relatively weak and evenly distributed across 
categories and subcategories.  
                                                     
27 Following Friedman and Popescu (2008), we estimate variable interaction effects by decomposing the prediction function into main 
and interaction effects and measuring how much of the variance in the model’s predictions depends on the latter. 
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By contrast, pairwise interaction effects appear to be relatively larger and more concentrated for the other 
two predicted ratings. In the case of RobecoSAM, the most substantial pairwise interaction effects are 
between financial and governance variables (especially between Valuation and Management), within 
financial variables (driven by the interaction between Balance Sheet and Operating Metrics), between 
environmental and social variables (mostly driven by the interaction between Emissions and Product 
Responsibility), and between finance variables and other (Valuation and Location). 
Similarly, for the predicted Sustainalytics rating, there are significant interaction effects between governance 
and environment (Management and Resource Use), between governance and finance (Human Rights and 
Balance Sheet), and within governance (variables in the Management subcategory).  
Perhaps surprisingly, the interaction between Classification (which includes a company's economic sector) 
and all the environmental, social, and governance subcategories appears to be very weak. This result is at 
odds with the use of sector-specific methodologies, a claim made by all three rating agencies in our 
sample.28 
Using standardized data, our analysis shows how the information processing matters for the ratings. Yet 
harmonization of the methods is not necessarily the solution. Not being able to reconcile the ratings due 
to their different data treatment is not an issue as long as the difference reflects the rating agencies' 
priorities, emphasizing the ESG issues they deem the most important. If that is the case, these choices need 
to be shared with the rating users, investors, or firms, which in turn will decide which rating is more in line 
with their priorities. 
 
 
                                                     
28 See Gaffuri (2017, p.11), Sutainalytics (2019, p. 5-6), and Thomson Reuters (2018, p. 6).  
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Figure 10. Overall Interaction Strength by Category 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data. 
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Figure 11. Overall Interaction Strength by Subcategory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data. 
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5.3.   RATINGS: OBSERVED VERSUS GENERATED  
To conclude our analysis, we check the ability of the generated ratings to replicate the level of disagreement 
observed between the actual ESG rating of the agencies. Comparing predicted and observed levels of 
disagreement offers valuable information to investors: it captures the difficulty in predicting and 
understanding the discrepancies across ESG scores based on information readily available to market 
participants. 
 
Table 5 reports correlation coefficients for each possible pair of ESG scores as predicted by the estimated 
random forests and as observed in the data. For all three pairs, the correlations between predicted scores 
are greater than those observed in the actual ESG rating of the agencies. Using similar data while allowing 
for different methods to process it strengthens the convergence across the ratings, confirming that the use 
of standardized data will lead to more comparable ratings.29 
 
. 
 
 
                                                     
29 Novick (2020) 
Table 5. Correlations between ESG Ratings: Observed and Predicted  
   
 Observed ESG Scores  Predicted ESG Scores  
RobecoSAM vs Sustainalytics 0.72 0.87 
RobecoSAM vs Thomson Reuters 0.65 0.82 
Sustainalytics vs Thomson Reuters 0.65 0.79 
Source: Authors' calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data. 
Note: The correlations are the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Inconsistencies and the lack of comparability across rating providers often confuse investors. While 
differences across ESG scores can naturally emerge if rating providers adopt different definitions of ESG 
performance, our analysis shows that differences arise even when the rating agencies declare using a similar 
definition. Thus, the focus when it comes to ESG ratings should not be on agreeing on a single definition, 
but on standardization of the data, achieving greater clarity in the labeling of the ratings and more 
transparency regarding their objectives. 
Our analysis illustrates how difficult it is to understand or predict the ratings. It shows that most of the 
discrepancies among rating providers cannot be easily explained by information readily available to 
investors or other users of these ratings. Yet, two clear outcomes emerge: 
- The three ratings strongly agree on who are the worst performers, with a correlation higher than 0.95. 
- The three ratings reach some consensus when measuring risks arising from governance factors, 
especially for Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy and Management. The first subcategory of 
governance includes variables that reflect a company's practices to communicate that it integrates the 
economic (financial), social and environmental dimensions into its day-to-day decision-making 
processes. The second one includes variables that measure a company's commitment and effectiveness 
towards following best practice and corporate governance principles. 
 
Overall, our study has two main implications when it comes to assessing how well-equipped firms are to 
deal with ESG risks. First, there is a need for standardization of the data. The use of standardized data will 
help to reconcile the ratings, at least partially. This emphasizes the lack of common disclosure standards, 
and the importance of aligning the different ESG disclosure standards existing across the world. The 
resulting harmonization of the data to be collected would allow rationalizing the reporting burden on the 
firms while increasing the quality of the data collected. One option could be to have a centralized data 
collection, a portal, where each firm would report its information.  The different rating agencies, regulators, 
and other ESG data providers or users would then pull information from this data hub. Ultimately this will 
increase the firms' participation while improving the rating agencies' credibility in the eyes of investors. 
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Creating harmonized and high-quality data is only part of the solution. The second implication of our study 
is the importance of transparency when it comes to the methodologies used to calculate the rating or the 
focus of the rating. Are E, S, and G factors equally important? Or is the rating focusing mostly on one 
dimension? Our study highlights the importance of the different methodologies used by the rating agencies 
to aggregate the data and their impact on the ratings. Having different emphasis across different rating 
agencies can provide useful information if the difference reflects a clear prioritization from the agencies, 
emphasizing the ESG issues they deem the most important. If that is the case, the agencies need to be 
transparent about it with the rating users, investors, or firms, which in turn will decide which rating is most 
in line with their priorities. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 1. NUMBER OF ESG-FOCUSED FUNDS IN LARGEST ASSET MANAGEMENT FIRMS 
 
 
 
 
 
Company 
# of Funds  
(All Share Classes) 
# of ESG Funds Percentage ESG 
BlackRock 1038 18 1.73% 
Vanguard 207 6 2.90% 
UBS 26 4 15.38% 
Fidelity 318 5 1.57% 
State Street 140 2 1.43% 
Allianz 51 3 5.88% 
Capital Group 62 0 0.00% 
JP Morgan Asset Management 197 2 1.02% 
Goldman Sachs 104 2 1.92% 
Bank of New York Mellon 205 8 3.90% 
PIMCO 146 14 9.59% 
Amundi 136 5 3.68% 
Prudential Financial 322 0 0.00% 
AXA Group 10 0 0.00% 
Morgan Stanley 262 7 2.67% 
Source: Morningstar Direct (7/5/2020). 
Note:  Funds classified as ESG explicitly stated in their mandates that investments were chosen primarily for their ESG-risk mitigating 
characteristics. Keywords in the primary investment mandate also included impact investing, gender/ethnic diversification, and 
environmental sustainability. 
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APPENDIX 2. ROE AND BETA BY ESG SCORE DECILE 
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APPENDIX 3. DISAGREEMENT AMONG RATING AGENCIES AND MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
The analysis in the main text indicates that the extent of disagreement among ESG rating agencies varies 
substantially across firms. To better understand what is driving this heterogeneity, this appendix shows 
correlations for each pair of ESG scores after dividing companies into deciles based on their market 
capitalization. Figures A.1 below shows the results of the exercise. First, consistent with our previous findings 
(both when we pool all firms and when we divide them by economic sector), RobecoSAM and Sustainalytics 
exhibit the highest pairwise correlation across all market capitalization deciles. Second, all pairwise 
correlations follow a relatively similar pattern as we move from companies with low market capitalization 
to companies with high market capitalization. Third, the relationship between the (average) level of 
agreement among rating agencies and the level of market capitalization is not monotonic. The level of 
agreement among rating agencies appears to be slightly higher for companies with intermediate levels of 
market capitalizations (i.e., deciles 4, 5, and 6) than for companies with low or large levels (especially those 
in deciles 2, 7, and 10). Taken together, the results suggest that it does not exist a clear relationship between 
the level of market capitalization and the degree of agreement among rating agencies in our sample. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data. 
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APPENDIX 4. DISAGREEMENT AMONG RATING AGENCIES AT THE FIRM-LEVEL 
Figure A.2 explores how disagreement varies across individual firms. It shows correlations between ESG 
scores after grouping companies based on an individual measure of "disagreement among rating agencies." 
30 Surprisingly, the results reveal that the extent of the inconsistencies among rating providers varies 
substantially across firms. Indeed, if disagreement among agencies were roughly constant across all 
companies, the curve in Figure A.2 would be relatively flat. Instead, the average correlation between ESG 
                                                     
30 To calculate our firm-level measure of disagreement, we first normalize all ESG scores by subtracting off their respective means and 
dividing them by their respective standard deviations. For each company in our sample, we then calculate the mean of the absolute 
value of the normalized scores across all three rating agencies. The resulting number is our firm-level measure of disagreement. For a 
similar exercise, see Berg et al. (2019). 
 
Figure A.2. Correlations between ESG Scores by Deciles based on Firm-Specific Measure 
of Disagreement 
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scores increases from a value of about 0 (for companies in the first decile) to a value slightly above 0.9 (for 
companies in the top decile).  
As discussed in section 4, economic sectors explain part of the variation in disagreement across firms. Figure 
A.3, which plots the distributions of ESG scores after grouping companies based on our firm-specific 
measure of disagreement, offers two additional insights. First, as the firm-level measure of inconsistencies 
increases, ESG scores move away from their respective means (i.e., the vertical dotted lines). Thus, the level 
of agreement among rating agencies appears to be higher for companies whose scores are away from the 
mean (i.e., "relatively good" and "relatively bad" firms) than it is for companies whose scores are close to 
the average. Second, for all three rating agencies, most companies in the top decile of our firm-specific 
measure of disagreement have extremely low ESG scores, indicating that the strongest agreement among 
rating providers occurs across the worst performers. 
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Figure A.3. ESG Score Distributions by Deciles based on our Firm-Specific Measure of 
Disagreement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data. 
Note: The vertical dotted line represents the overall average score for each of the rating agencies. 
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APPENDIX 5. TOP INDIVIDUAL PREDICTORS FOR ESG SCORES 
Variable Category Definition 
Environment 
Management Training 
Environmental 
Does the company train its employees on environmental 
issues?  
Environmental Supply 
Chain Management 
Environmental 
Does the company use environmental criteria (ISO 
14000, energy consumption, etc.) in the selection 
process of its suppliers or sourcing partners? 
Policy Emissions Environmental 
Does the company have a policy to improve emission 
reduction?  
Policy Energy 
Efficiency 
Environmental 
Does the company have a policy to improve its energy 
efficiency?  
Policy Environmental 
Supply Chain 
Environmental 
Does the company have a policy to include its supply 
chain in the company's efforts to lessen its overall 
environmental impact? 
Renewable Energy 
Use 
Environmental Does the company make use of renewable Energy?  
Resource Reduction 
Policy 
Environmental 
Does the company have a policy for reducing the use of 
natural resources or to lessen the environmental impact 
of its supply chain? 
Resource Reduction 
Targets 
Environmental 
Does the company set specific objectives to be achieved 
on resource efficiency? 
Targets Emissions Environmental 
Has the company set targets or objectives to be 
achieved on emission reduction? 
Flexible Working 
Hours 
Social 
Does the company claim to provide flexible working 
hours or working hours that promote a work-life 
balance? 
Fundamental Human 
Rights ILO UN 
Social 
Does the company claim to comply with the 
fundamental human rights convention of the ILO or 
support the UN declaration of human rights? 
Human Rights 
Contractor 
Social 
Does the company report or show to use human rights 
criteria in the selection or monitoring process of its 
suppliers or sourcing partners? 
Policy Human Rights Social 
Does the company have a policy to ensure the respect of 
human rights in general? 
Board Gender 
Diversity 
Governance Percentage of female on the board. 
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CSR Reporting Governance 
Does the company publish a separate 
CSR/H&S/Sustainability report or publish a section in its 
annual report on CSR/H&S/Sustainability issues? 
Global Compact 
Signatory 
Governance 
Has the company signed the UN Global Compact? The 
UN GC is a non-binding united nations pact to 
encourage businesses worldwide to adopt sustainable 
and socially responsible policies, and to report on their 
implementation. 
Independent Board 
Members 
Governance 
Percentage of independent board members as reported 
by the company. 
Stakeholder 
Engagement 
Governance 
Does the company explain how it engages with its 
stakeholders? How is it involving the stakeholders in its 
decision-making process?   
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APPENDIX 6. VARIABLE SUBCATEGORIES 
Category Subcategory Subcategory Definition 
Environmental Emissions 
Variables that measure a company's commitment and 
effectiveness towards reducing environmental emissions 
in its production and operational processes. 
Environmental Innovation 
Variables that reflect a company's capacity to reduce the 
environmental costs and burdens for its customers, 
thereby creating new market opportunities through new 
environmental technologies and processes or eco-
designed products. 
Environmental Resource Use 
Variables that reflect a company's performance and 
capacity to reduce the use of materials, Energy or water, 
and to find more eco-efficient solutions by improving 
supply chain management. 
Social Community  
Variables that reflect a company's commitment to being 
a good citizen, protecting public health and respecting 
business ethics. 
Social Human Rights  
Variables that reflect a company's effectiveness in terms 
of respecting fundamental human rights conventions. 
Social Product Responsibility  
Variables that reflect a company's capacity to produce 
quality goods and services, integrating the customer's 
health and safety, integrity, and data privacy. 
Social Workforce  
Variables that measure company's effectiveness in terms 
of providing job satisfaction, a healthy and safe 
workplace, maintaining diversity and equal opportunities 
and development opportunities for its workforce. 
Governance CSR Strategy  
Variables that reflect a company's practices to 
communicate that it integrates economic (financial), 
social and environmental dimensions into its day-to-day 
decision-making processes. 
Governance Management  
Variables that measure a company's commitment and 
effectiveness towards following best practice corporate 
governance principles. 
Governance Shareholders  
Variables that measure a company's effectiveness 
towards equal treatment of shareholders and the use of 
anti-takeover devices. 
Financial Balance Sheet 
Variables that reflect a company's assets, liabilities, and 
shareholders' equity. 
Financial Cash Flow Statement 
Variables that summarizes the amount of cash and cash 
equivalents entering and leaving a company. 
Financial Income Statement 
Variables that measure a company's revenues and 
expenses during a particular period. It also includes 
variables indicating how the revenues are transformed 
into the net income or net profit. 
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Financial Operating Metrics 
Variables that illustrate a company's overall performance 
such as Return on Equity, Return on Assets, and EBITDA. 
Financial Trading Statistics 
Variables that reflect the trading of a company's stock. It 
includes variables such as monthly Sharpe Ratio, 
volatility, institutional Ownership, 200-day Price PCT 
Change, and liquidity measures. 
Financial Valuation Metrics 
Variables that reflect and are related to a company's 
valuation such as market capitalization, enterprise value, 
P/E Ratio, P/EG Ratio, Beta, and dividend yield. 
Others Classification 
Economic sector according to the Thomson Reuters 
Business Classification. 
Others Location 
Country of headquarters, also known as Country of 
Domicile. 
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APPENDIX 7. CALCULATING VARIABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 
To understand how variable contributions are calculated in a random forest model, notice that given a set 
of independent variables or predictors, we can estimate how the value of the prediction changes after every 
split in each decision tree. Since each split is associated with a variable, and since the split either adds or 
subtracts to the predicted value given in the previous node, the final prediction can be decomposed as the 
sum of the variable contributions plus the "bias" (i.e., the model's prediction at the beginning of the decision 
tree). After averaging over all the individual decision trees in the random forest model, the final prediction 
can be decomposed as follows: 
prediction(x) = bias + contribution(1, x) + … + contribution(n, x) 
where 
 x is a set of predictors, 
 bias is the model's prediction before using any predictor (usually the mean of the variable we want 
to predict in the original dataset),  
 contribution(j, x) is the contribution of variable j to the final prediction, and 
 n is the number of predictors. 
Although the previous expression is superficially similar to a linear regression, the coefficients of a linear 
regression are fixed, with a single constant for every variable. For the random forest model, by contrast, the 
contribution of each variable is a complex function. One that also depends on all the other variables, which 
together determine the decision path that generates the prediction and thus the contributions that are 
passed along the way. 31 
APPENDIX 8. OBSERVED VERSUS GENERATED RATINGS AND FIRMS' CHARACTERISTICS 
                                                     
31 For a detailed discussion of the methodology, see https://blog.datadive.net/interpreting-random-forests/ 
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In this appendix, we explore whether the ability of our model to account for the disagreement among ESG 
rating agencies varies with some of the firms' characteristics. To this end, we divide companies by economic 
sector and market capitalization decile, and then compare the mean and median correlations between the 
ESG scores observed in the actual data with those predicted by the random forest models. Figures A.4(a) 
and A.5(a) shows the results of the exercise. The results suggest that the random forests do a reasonably 
good job at capturing variations in the level of disagreement among rating agencies across sectors and 
market capitalization deciles, but that they tend to underpredict the level itself. Thus, the figures seem to 
indicate that the importance of factors not captured by the random forests in explaining the disagreement 
among rating agencies remains significant across all economic sectors and market capitalization deciles. 
This last point is confirmed by Figures A.5(b) and 4.5(b), which display the fraction of disagreement 
explained by the random forest models for each economics sector and market capitalization decile. The 
figures show that the ability of the random forests to account for the disagreement among agencies ranges 
from 45.2% to 67.3% across economic sectors and from 46.6% to 59.5% across market capitalization. 
Although the specific numbers may vary, the overall picture seems to confirm that the models can account 
for around half of the observed disagreement among rating agencies. 
Figure A.4. Explanatory Power of Random Forest Models by Economic Sector 
 
    a) Predicted vs Observed Correlations                                  b) % of Disagreement Explained 
by RF Models 
         between ESG Scores       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data. 
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Figure A.5. Explanatory Power of Random Forest Models by Market Capitalization Decile 
 
    a) Predicted vs Observed Correlations                                    b) % of Disagreement Explained by 
RF Models 
         between ESG Scores       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bloomberg and Refinitiv Eikon data. 
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